Getting it wrong, getting it right

So it may not have escaped your notice that the UK has just held a decisive General Election (above). The Conservatives triumphant; the Scottish National Party celebrating; everyone else flatlining or crushed. The age of English and Scottish Nationalism is upon us, and our next constitutional battles are likely to see those two forces fight it out for the future of the United Kingdom. Oh good.

But where does that leave our predictions, here at Public Policy and the Past? One of the main losers on 12 December was Britain’s main Opposition, the Labour Party. They got run out of town in whole areas of the country where they used to dominate – not just stereotypical ‘Northern England’, where if you read some of the papers you’d think there was a whippet and a pint of warm ale on every corner – but in parts of the Midlands and South where they used to dominate.

Let’s go to Harlow and Stevenage, shall we? Two New Towns full of blue-collar workers where Labour held the historically-marginal seats until 2010. Now it’s a sea of blue as far as the eye can see. What about Cannock Chase, or Redditch in Worcestershire? They’re now so far out of Labour’s reach that they would need arms like a Mr Man to get anywhere near. There are simply not enough urban, young or studenty seats (hello, Edinburgh South and Truro and Falmouth) to make up for Labour’s historic collapse across Deep England – North, South, East and West.

That presents us with a problem, because, er, we said Labour could win this – not as a majority (without any real presence in Scotland, that looks impossible), but as a minority governing with the say-so of other parties – particularly the SNP and the Liberal Democrats. That was, well, let’s not gloss this… wrong.

That’s okay in a way though, because as we’ve said before the job of speculating (let’s not call it forecasting, shall we?) is to learn – to see clearly where you thought the pieces would fall, and the reasons why you thought that, against how they actually broke down. So this election result is a great opportunity to test our priors against reality. Why did we think Labour could get so close to the Tories, and why didn’t they?

Here’s what we thought back in the summer: Labour was deeply unpopular, but it still had three advantages over the Conservatives. One, the Tories were imploding. Their Parliamentary Party was in the process of what looked like a historic split between Liberal Conservatives and Tory particularists (as in 1846). Two, Boris Johnson was a great leader for Labour, deeply, deeply unpopular among all those swathes of liberal and Remain England in which the red team had to get a hearing and win back Liberal Democrat and Green defectors (and those famous Don’t Knows). Three, Labour had and has a huge membership that could give them a big advantage in the ground game – flooding marginal seats with activists that might not be able to convert people to their cause, but sure could Get Out The Vote.

Turns out this was really wrong. But we’ve at least got three categories in which to ask the question: why? Setting up opinions, and setting yourselves up to get shot down or proved wrong, is a good thing for these reasons. It allows self-reflection. It permits self-audit. It gives you the colour-in boxes to fill in after the event, and maybe to ask better questions and get it wrong more narrowly next time.

So, category one. The Tories didn’t implode. Prime Minister Johnson was able to expel the dissident pro-European wing from his Parliamentary Party and lose almost no electoral support. Amidst all the talk of Labour Leavers and their desertion from Labour, there’s been nowhere near enough talk of Conservative Remainers. In the end, a big majority of them stayed with the Tories. Why? Well, they were simply afraid of Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn. On top of (and related to) that, the Liberal Democrats had a torrid campaign in which yet again almost everything went wrong for them, as in 2017 - though the experiences of the February 1974 and June 1983 elections ought to have alerted us earlier to the possibility that two unpleasant extremes might tear their voter base apart rather than glue it together. In any case, a more emollient Labour leader and a more humble, focused Liberal Democrat advance might have rumbled the Tories. It didn’t happen.

On to category two. Johnson was indeed unpopular, but there are two reasons why this didn’t matter in the end. He wasn’t all that unpopular in Leave England (or Leave Wales): and because his mission was to unite the Leave vote around himself, and not around Nigel Farage’s upstart Brexit Party, that was all fine and dandy for him. The Brexit Party crashed to almost nothing, and despite having a couple of what amounted to good by-elections amidst the din (in Barnsley and Hartlepool), the very darkly comic character known as ‘Boris’ in the end looked like the best bet for everyone who wanted to leave the European Union.

The second reason why Johnson triumphed, despite being one of the most unpopular PMs ever at this stage of his stay in No. 10, was that he was pretty popular when set against Corbyn. Johnson was the political equivalent of a McDonald’s: divisive, likely to make you pretty unhealthy in the end, but a fast and dirty meal. Corbyn was more like a Little Chef: much talked about, never visited.

What about three, Labour’s ground game? Well, that didn’t work that well. You can’t polish a turd, of course – and Labour’s manifesto was absolutely deadly in that it made people laugh, not read. But the interesting points here go deeper. Activist turnout and effects were good in Putney, Labour’s only gain of the night, where the party was able to put out hundreds and hundreds of activists. Anywhere near a train station, on the Tube, at the end of a tram line? Great. Young engaged activists could pour in and make a big difference. Anywhere else – anywhere where you needed a car, say, oh… everywhere in Deep England? Much less successful.

Labour’s targeting operation also sent those really fresh and optimistic troops into dead-cert Tory seats, thus throwing away one of their only advantages. They did that partly because election supremo Karie Murphy doesn’t really know anything about elections, to some extent because their reading of 2017 was that they weren’t aggressive enough to gain more seats, and in places because they wanted to move people away from where they might actually save Labour MPs who don’t like Corbyn. As so often, one of the most tragic elements is just how much hope and goodwill has been squandered by the Labour-haters who now occupy the Labour cockpit.

One last thing. As so often, the feeling from the gut, and the first trigger movement, were right – and all the intellectualising and post-hoc data were wrong. Here at Public Policy and the Past, our first instinct was that Labour was heading for a terrible defeat from the moment it elected Corbyn. That’s not a Left-Right point so much as a point about the people around him, the long associations and ideas with which he was associated and would by which he would become known, and the poisonous influence of the super-union Unite – which has now taken over the Labour Party in all but name.

Many Corbynite insights are right. Britain does need much better public services, better organised public transport, more lifelong education. But as we’ve said again and again, these weren’t the people, and their presumptions weren’t the ideas, by which to carry that argument. Let’s end this experiment where we began, in the autumn of 2015:

There is a difference between inspiration and the peddling of false hope. Because what will happen when Mr Corbyn is either ousted by his Parliamentary colleagues, or – even worse for Labour – is actually allowed to collide with the electorate, like a piece of space debris burning up as it smashes into the atmosphere? The eye-popping but fake sugar rush of this microwaved Tony Benn’s elevation having passed, the subsequent crash will be terrible. There will be the blankest, darkest, most painful despair you can imagine, followed by blame – of Blairites, the media, the public themselves – who were not clever or far-sighted enough to accede to the Corbyn revelation… And then what? Then what? The answer, you know in your hearts, is this: decades of unbroken Conservative dominance. And a Britain that becomes less fair, less equal, less open, less liberal, less European – and less respected – with every passing day.

So there are three interesting academic lessons to be learned from the 2019 General Election: about the nature of the Conservative vote, now quite dependent on older, more socially conservative Britons who live in towns; the importance of relative and not absolute popularity; and the limits of a load of activists carrying a message that voters just don’t like. But the most important lesson of all? Sometimes, trust your instincts.

So where are the don't knows now?

Regular readers will know that Public Policy and the Past is obsessed, absolutely obsessed, with the ‘don’t knows’ that you don’t usually read about when you scan the headline figures in voting intention polls. So - as we head towards the finishing line of yet another national election (thank the Lord), maybe it’s time to have another look at them. 

There are three reasons for going back over this territory. The first is a general point. The don’t knows form the background hum of where the voters are coming in and out of each big camp – where the parties don’t have to detach people from another tribe to rally them around their colours, but only from a kind of weak attraction or half-remembered past association.

The second reason we’re obsessed with this point is more specific, and it’s, well, once bitten, twice shy. When then-Prime Minister Theresa May called a snap General Election in 2017, Britain’s Labour Party looked completely dead and buried. Opinion polls put them twenty points and more behind. A couple even gave the Tories double Labour’s vote. But then they zoomed up and zoomed up in the polls. Eventually, they hit 40 per cent in the final vote.

Why? Well, partly because May ran the worst campaign in British political history (at least since Labour’s in 1983), but also because there was one key point most of us prognosticators had missed: the sheer number of people who had voted Labour in 2015, but who were saying ‘don’t know’ at the start of the 2017 campaign. They duly turned up and voted Labour when the chips were down. We’re not making the mistake of leaving them out of account again.

The third factor behind this latter-day voyage around the don’t knows? Well, the 2019 General Election is beginning to look a bit like the 2017 one. Not exactly, not precisely, but quite a bit. For one thing, both parties are polling below the levels they reached during that campaign, and secondly, Labour’s score doesn’t seem to be accelerating upwards as fast it did last time.

But Labour are all the same gaining ground now, cutting the Conservatives’ lead in a number of surveys to bare single figures. Not a single national Voting Intention poll has yet implied a Hung Parliament, but one might well soon (and, given normal variation, probably will) – sparking that panic in Conservative ranks that we saw in 1987 and 1992, before their polling woes abated.

So where are we with the don’t knows this time? Could they come to Labour’s aid again, cutting the Conservatives’ lead from – on average – maybe nine points, pushing it below the all-important six points which means thatthe Conservatives lose their overall majority? Well, the answer is the classic academic’s cop-out: sort of, and sort of not. If we could chuck one of those hands-in-the-air don’t know emojis at you, we would. Which is funny really. Okay, maybe you had to be there.

Let’s have a scoot around the figures. We’ve gone through the last eight pollsters to report (and put out their tables), and excluded Deltapoll and Kantar, who don’t provide a crossbreak for ‘don’t know’ now and party allegiance in 2017. That leaves us with the data from six companies – Survation, YouGov, Opinium, SavantaComRes, Panelbase and BMG. That should be quite enough to get a general impression of where the don’t knows are right now. There are lots of ways you could cut this data (by gender, for instance, which suggests that Labour probably will benefit from a late move), but for brevity's sake here we'll focus on the 'past vote' category.

The answers aren't as encouraging for Labour (and for those in search of a Hung Parliament) as they might be. There is a differential, in that there are more ex-Labour don’t knows than Conservative, but it doesn’t look like there are enough on their own to close that polling gap. Survation will give Labour people the most hope. That firm suggests that 7.6 per cent of Tory voters from 2017 are now ‘undecided’, against a much bigger 13 per cent from the red team – though on the other hand ‘refused’ amounts to 2.2 per cent of 2017 Tories and 0.6 per cent of Labour voters from the last election, so we’re probably better off saying 9.8 per cent Tory to 13.6 per cent Labour. If they all move back to their prior teams, that’s worth maybe a point off the Conservatives’ lead.

Elsewhere, the news is less rosy for the Left. The latest YouGov poll has 10 per cent of 2017 Conservative voters saying ‘don’t know’, or refusing to answer, and 13 per cent of Labour – with rounding, not much of a better result than Survation’s for Jeremy Corbyn’s party, but still worse (for reference, the split was 12 per cent to 18 per cent in the last YouGov poll before the Commons voted for an early election). Opinium does have 16 per cent of ex-Labour voters outside London saying ‘don’t know’, and only 9 per cent of ex-Conservatives – a differential that might be worth a couple of points extra to Labour – but with a pollster which shows than lagging 15 per cent behind Boris Johnson’s party.

Lastly, there are three pollsters which show only a one point difference between the don’t knows among 2017 Labour and Conservative voters: Savanta ComRes, Panelbase and BMG. Those firms are showing 6 per cent of Conservatives undecided against 7 per cent of Labour, 5 per cent and 7 per cent, and lastly 9 per cent and 10 per cent. Not much comfort there.

What does this mean? It means that Labour can’t rely on the don’t knows. It will, in all likelihood, get a bit of uplift from that source, but not the three or maybe four points extra it needs to force Boris Johnson into another round of Brexit hell – or even, perhaps, form a government themselves. Labour will need to seek votes elsewhere. This will, of course, prove a harder task.

Labour’s chances therefore now rest on squeezing the Liberal Democrats and the Greens even harder, since the real battleground seems to be across the English Midlands and North, where the Conservatives are hoping to win a string of seats that have been traditionally (and culturally) Labour. That will be hard. Not impossible given a very volatile and uncertain electorate, but more difficult than convincing the don't knows. Labour have already pulled over a lot – and we mean a lot – of those votes already (the Liberal Democrats are five or six points down from their autumn peak). And those votes are unusual and sparse in many of these areas – in Great Grimsby, for instance, which at this point looks fairly doomed as a Labour seat. Hoping to convert almost all of Grimsby's remaining Lib Dems seems like a long shot.

So we’ve got a fix on the don’t knows. There aren’t that many of them left: very likely not enough on their own to force the Tories below 322 seats and into an effective minority. But Labour have climbed two ladders. They’ve definitely relegated the Liberal Democrats into second. They’ve powered up with ex-Labour returnees. Now they’ve released those gravity-defying rockets, the third stage is the hardest: get back Labour voters going Tory in small town England. Those afterburners might fire. They might not. A lot hangs on what happens when Labour presses that button.

Can Labour surge again?

So, first things first: welcome back after the summer break! It’s been nice not to have to think about politics and public policy for a while, hasn’t it? Though that brings us to second things second: the deadening pass-the-turd that passes for political life in the United Kingdom these days. Sorry, but it’s got to be done – and, given that you’re here, you might as well come along for the ride.

Given the looming near-certainty of a General Election, this month we thought we’d take a really close look at the likely prospects for such a contest. Away from the rather tawdry prospect of what one might laughably call the Government’s ‘ideas’, and its hyperventilating throw-it-all-at-the-wall approach to Brexit, the great standing fact in British politics these days is just how unpopular the Opposition is. Will that last all the way through a campaign? Let’s take a look.

Labour is very unpopular. In fact, both the party and particularly its histrionic eye-rolling leader, Jeremy Corbyn, are not so much unpopular as extraordinarily, cosmically, stratospherically loathed. There’s never been an Opposition this low in the polls just before a General Election (of which, more in a moment), and there’s never been a Leader of the Opposition who’s this unpopular. It’s hard to look beyond that to see them forming a new government.

But Labour also plumbed the depths of public opprobrium early in 2017, managing to lose a byelection that should never have been in doubt and to take a fearful hammering in that year’s local elections. Just a few weeks later, in early June, they got to 40 per cent in the popular vote – some fifteen points above where they stood early in that year’s election campaign.

We think there were four reasons for this. The first was that Labour were able to bring their undecided or wavering ex-voters back, whether it was from other parties, don’t know or wouldn’t vote. Secondly, Mr Corbyn’s own ratings improved as he moved into campaign mode – since he’s hopeless at running anything, but actually very good at rallies. Thirdly, Labour put out some really popular policies that attracted the attention of an electorate weary of seven years of public sector spending cuts. Fourth and last, the polls probably always undersold Labour, since some pollsters were putting on ‘likely voter’ screens that turned out to be based on inaccurate calls on turnout by age and outlook. So, can Labour repeat the trick? Let’s look at each of those factors in turn.

1. Don’t know and won’t vote. When Labour reached its polling nadir in the second half of April 2017, many of their voters were in a funk. They had been put off Labour by its revolving door of rows and splits, and frankly they thought Mr Corbyn a liability. In the YouGov poll of 18-19 April 2017, 22 per cent of people who’d voted Labour in 2015 said that they didn’t know who they’d vote for, or they wouldn’t vote. The figure for the Conservatives? Just 11 per cent. Then something happened that very few observers had taken nearly seriously enough: these voters started to return to their previous colours. Under conditions of forced choice, what else could they do? Vote Conservative? Many of them had cultural, familial and ideological objections to that, whatever their doubts about the new model Labour Party. So the squeeze was on – and in YouGov’s last pre-election poll, that figure for ex-Labour don’t knows plus won’t votes was down to just seven per cent.

What’s the situation now? Well, there’s still that gap between ex-Labour protestors that might come home and the same figure for the Conservatives. Except this year, it’s somewhat smaller. The last three YouGov polls have seen that weak disaffiliation run at between 17 and 20 per cent for Labour, versus 13 to 14 per cent for the Tories – a smaller gap than in 2017, but a gap nonetheless. So there’s less opportunity for a squeeze here, and of course there’s also less room to power up from other parties’ numbers – because the Liberal Democrat surge is allowing liberal Labourites and Remainers to adhere to a new loyalty that often feels stronger and more pressing than their older view of the dichotomy between Left and Right. Labour can still put the heat on these voters, especially because very few Liberal Democrats think they’re actually going to win an election, but it looks like a less likely source of votes than it once did.

2. How high can Corbyn climb? During the last election campaign, Jeremy Corbyn pushed his numbers up very quickly – even more quickly, in fact, than Neil Kinnock managed during Labour’s well-managed and glossily-packaged 1987 campaign. Alas, that still put him underwater by polling day (at -11 with Ipsos-Mori), but just a few weeks before, in Mori’s March survey, he’d been at -41. It was a phenomenal achievement, in part linked to the popular policies he was espousing (such as the end of undergraduate tuition fees in England), but also the fact that he just believed what he was saying. He’s been opposing Tory austerity from one end of a megaphone all his life. Small wonder he proved to be good at it.

Gallingly for both his own best interests and Labour’s, things went south again pretty quickly after that. Corbyn and his key allies spent all their political capital in disappointing factional battle after scarcely believable blunder after badly handled falsehood. Instead of reaching out, they doubled down. And so Corbyn’s numbers fell again, so much so that now they’re even worse than just before the 2017 campaign. His Ipsos-Mori rating is now at -60 (the worst ever for an Opposition leader).

We should again be cautious here. Then, Corbyn’s ‘best Prime Minister’ rating fell to 14 per cent with YouGov: in May 2019, he bottomed out at again at about the same level – 15 per cent. Interestingly, too, there’s just a few signs of life here. Some of Mr Corbyn’s approval and performance ratings have begun to recover a little, driven by Remainers warming to him just slightly. You can track the numbers by checking in with this very interesting Twitter account, which we recommend. All this looks to us like Mr Corbyn can indeed recover again, just like Ed Miliband did in 2017. But it’s a deeper hole than before. Are those real signs of life? Or just the wiggling legs of an upturned Texan armadillo cooking in the desert? It’s not entirely clear, but if we had to bet, we’d say it’s all uphill from here.

3. Labour’s new policies. What a great big slice of the public really wants is just some respite from the torture their political class have been putting them through. Brexit: make it stop. Austerity: take it away. Public services: get them working. You get the picture. So when Labour in 2017 came out with a load of anti-austerity spending plans, albeit ones that were so fuzzily funded they looked like a blurry shot of Bigfoot striding through the mountains, people liked it. More police officers? Great. No more cuts to schools and hospitals? Super. Fighting the rising scourge of homelessness? Sign us up. So far, so explicable - and right. More deeply, the understandable feeling has risen and risen among the electorate that there’s much that’s not fair and not right about British capitalism. That’s natural enough after nine years of right-wing government. So a dash of nationalisation and a side order of redistribution went down nicely. Polls show that a number of Labour’s flagship policies were and are (more or less) popular.

Now, there’s more room for doubt. Both quantitative and qualitative evidence shows that the more radical shores of Corbynism 2.0 unveiled or passed at Labour’s recent conference are not going to go down nearly so smoothly. Abolish private schools? The public don’t like that idea one bit. Step in to save the travel agent Thomas Cook? No – in widescreen. Big likely increases in Inheritance Tax via a lifetime gift tax, possible land taxes, extra income tax rises to fund all of Labour’s even bigger spending plans that time round, freer movement of peoples, state pharma, even a four day week – most voters are unlikely to think of these as the radical, but still plausible and believable, plans they heard in 2017. It’s not clear in what state any of this will make Labour’s manifesto, of course, but if it sounds like that shopping list, fewer voters will go out and buy it.

4. Counting the voters. One reason pollsters missed the Conservative majority of 2015 was down to turnout. They were, quite simply, sampling the wrong people. Their ‘frame’ was out. Older, conservative Britons were just more likely to actually turn up on the day. So some of the pollsters – notably ComRes, which pointed out the discrepancy on the eve of poll in 2015 – started to weight all their numbers like that. Young, urban, renting? Your scores got marked down a bit. What this meant – when for instance older Britons appalled by Theresa May’s proposed social care charges sat out the 2017 election – was a set of polls out in the other direction, scratching off some Labour numbers and puffing up the Tory score. That’s a very, very crude description of what was going on, and we wince to write it. But stay with us here.

This time, there’s a bit of feeling about that the polls might be overstating Labour slightly. The party’s final polling average just before the European Parliament elections was about 19 per cent. They actually got 14 per cent of the vote in Great Britain. The Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, were registering at about 16 per cent in those same polls, but they managed to attract 20 per cent of the vote. Something kept the Labour numbers too high, and pegged back the Liberal Democrats. What seems to be happening is that pollsters who weight by recalled past vote – ComRes, for instance – are boosting the Labour vote share. People are forgetting they voted Labour, and to beef up the ‘2017 Labour’ share of the sample, surveyors are pulling more Labourites in. That inflates both the number of past Labour voters and the Labour score in the final voting intention headlines, as work by both Kantar and YouGov has demonstrated (both open as PDF).

So there we have it. Some of the context now looks like 2017. In particular, the number of ex-Labour voters wary of saying they’ll vote Labour next time is not vastly lower than in 2017 – though there are indeed fewer of them. Jeremy Corbyn’s numbers have already started to show a tiny bit of life, though on some measures he’s starting from lower down this time. But other elements, both in terms of Labour’s new and more Corbynite stance as well as geeky details hidden deep within the polling methodology, militate somewhat in the other direction. Can Labour climb again? Yes. Will they? Almost certainly. Will it be as steep an upward curve as last time? It looks unlikely.

Here’s the real kicker, though. The lift-off doesn’t have to be as vertiginous. Some – but only some – of the elements that made for Labour’s afterburners last time are there again. Some of them might not work as well this time, but they don’t have to. That's because the Tories are lower, and not so far ahead. If we look at the polling averages, they’re about eight points in front of Labour, not the 16 per cent of April 2017. Boris Johnson is nowhere near as popular as Theresa May was then: his Ipsos-Mori score is -18 to Mrs May’s +13 just before the 2017 campaign. Yes, voters think of Mr Corbyn as an unpalatable mix of Wolfie Smith and Keith from Nuts in May – but in Mr Johnson he faces a nasty old cross between Billy Bunter and South Park’s Cartman. Shilling shop Rasputin versus penny shop Disraeli: no wonder voters are uncertain.

To reiterate: can Labour surge once more? Yes. Can the same forces behind their 2017 surprise work for them again? Not to the same extent. Will they achieve critical velocity this time? No-one knows. They can and might close the gap enough to govern as a minority. That’s all we know. Sorry, but them’s the facts. As we always say: it’s not nothing, but it is something.

It's all over... for now

So that's it. It's a wrap for the academic year 2018/19. It's been another pathetic and embarrassing year for British politics, with the fall of one Prime Minister and the rise of another who makes Captain Caveman look like Socrates. With the Government in chaos, and the official Opposition a disgusting rabble, there isn't much to cheer about. But what there is, while you're here, is the summer - with plenty of opportunities, whatever your fitness and abilities, to get out into Britain and beyond. Enjoy, recharge, and we'll see you back here in September. Then, the long crisis will resume, with potentially one or two more General Elections, and one, two or more referendums. You lucky people. Be well, be kind, and remember: we have more in common than that which divides us.

Advance, Britannia!

It’s hard to maintain much optimism about British politics. The structural faultlines look too great to be surmounted. Something’s going to have to give – probably in the midst of the huge constitutional crisis we look to be heading into this autumn. One or more General Elections, another referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union, another Scottish independence referendum, a border poll in Northern Ireland – they are all set to divide us in the years to come. Instead of getting on with maybe making schools and hospitals better, Parliament will be tearing itself to pieces over the constitution, just as it did in the 1880s and the 1910s. It’s depressing stuff. Where once Prime Minister Winston Churchill bellowed ‘advance,Britannia!’ at the moment of victory in 1945, our leaders now squeak out a litany of retreats into the obscurity to which history will surely condemn them. 

But look out beyond the politics, and the country is not actually on fire. That’s something important to remember when writing about the apparent state of crisis in Westminster and Whitehall. Yes, growth is slowing, but it’s still there. True, wage increases are only now taking us back to those halcyon days of 2007 and 2008 when we thought that the economy might expand forever – but there is wage growth. Yes, we face a climate emergency. But the United Kingdom is doing its bit. It’s on target to meet its Copenhagen commitments in the short-term, and it might be able to hit its targets in the medium- to long-term as well. Indeed, the Government has just legislated to take us to net zero carbon by 2050. The planet is in trouble, but the UK is at least trying to do something about it.

We can in fact look back at lots of crises that seems just as bad, at the time, if not worse. The summer of 1940 was an immeasurably more acute crisis – not that it’s much relief that Britain's armed forces aren't now in full retreat from fascists who wanted to crush the country's entire way of life. Narrowing in a bit more to the comparable disasters of the post-war age, the Suez Crisis of 1956 was an unmitigated catastrophe that saw Britain’s diplomatic position completely obliterated in just a few short weeks – and which claimed the lives of 16 British servicemen. The country often seemed on the brink of ungovernability in 1972-73, especially given the chronic breakdown of civil order in Northern Ireland. In 1976, the UK was forced into painful austerity by the International Monetary Fund, while in 1981-82 Britain’s cities went up in flames as unemployment and poverty soared.

Our present crisis is in most respects nowhere near as acute as it seemed during those previous disasters. Employment growth is strong, indeed puzzlingly so, and it’s concentrated in full-time permanent jobs. Inflation is very low, though it’s crept up a little as the pound has been hit by Brexit uncertainty. Mortgage and interest rates remain in their historic troughs. Things are very, very hard indeed if you rely on any element of Britain’s fraying welfare state, and public services (particularly those run by local councils) are beginning to run into the sands. But for most people, in most places, things are just about okay. They go on living their lives, their rich, dense, detailed, multi-hued, familial, variegated, fascinating, comforting, challenging, infuriating lives – just as they did during the Depression and the long post-war boom alike. Life goes on, and seems to have been getting better, at least in so far as long term trends in self-reported happiness tell us anything. 

Consider the latest instalment of that magisterial text of post-war social history, 63 Up. Ever since 1964, and for the most part helmed by filmmaker Michael Apted, these documentaries have heralded the ups, downs, sideways and diagonals of normal people from all walks of life. And what have they been doing? Getting on with things. You can watch one of the first episodes here (it aired as 7-Up), and ITV has recently shown the latest in the serial. If you want our advice, you should go and watch these right now, and maybe catch up with the rest of the series, but the point we’re trying to make will hopefully stand whether you’ve seen these programmes or not.

There’s cabbie Tony, doing okay for himself; Nick, who became an academic in the United States, but who is now very, very ill; Bruce, who used to teach in some pretty difficult schools, but who latterly moved into the independent sector; Lynn, who held onto her job as a children’s librarian through change after change at the council, but who’s sadly now died; Paul, long troubled by being brought up in a children’s home, who’s since moved to Australia; John the barrister, now doing good works in Bulgaria, his mother’s native country; and the star of the show, Neil (above), once homeless in the Highlands, but now serving as a lay preacher and a Liberal Democrat County Councillor in Cumbria. 

They might not have been splitting the atom. They may not have been storming the beaches on D-Day. They haven’t been living a glamorous high life with the elite, like John Maynard Keynes, choosing to spend his health on what he saw as his mission to save the British economy. None of them have won a gold medal. It’s not been that kind of heroism. But they have been living heroic lives nonetheless: teaching kids from tough backgrounds, taking the mobile library out, raising money for orphans in Eastern Europe, serving the community as councillors, coming to terms with their own struggles with the past and the present, building new lives in new nations, bringing up their children. It is here, and not in what passes for the directing mind of the political nation, where true leadership lies.

We may well all have been let down by those fraudulent pipsqueaks who have the temerity even to use the word ‘leader’ in the face of such citizens. But their endeavours continue to inspire, even all these years after 1964 –  that year of Labour’s re-election among hopeful talk of that ‘white heat’ which would reforge the nation itself. Our ‘leaders’ are in retreat. But Britannia? Well, Britannia advances.

Running the sliderule over 'Land for the many'

Given that Labour now looks fairly likely to be in power in the near future, it’s important to look at some of the Party’s policy pronouncements – such as the recent report on land policy written for Labour by environmentalist and campaigner George Monbiot. You can read the whole thing here if you want (opens in PDF). Constraints of time and space mean that today we’ll look really at the impact on the housing market, though the whole thing is worth a read.

Some of the recommendations are strong ones, and no-one should be in any doubt that the land and housing market is clearly malfunctioning: at a time when housing capital costs in many cities are many multiples even of joint incomes, and when rents have been increasing far more quickly than earnings. There should be little controversy, for instance, about the proposals in Land for the Many which would improve disclosure and transparency. Chapter Two of the Report contains welcome ideas for reducing Britain’s reputation as a haven for dirty money.  

Overall, there is also a very strong case for moving our taxation structure relatively away from income and towards wealth – often inherited wealth such as land. In general, the proposals here would indeed mean more tax on the intergenerational movement of that money, more progressive taxes on property, and more of the profits of land ownership and landlordism being returned to the community that has mandated the planning system in the first place (and therefore produced a lot of that wealth in the first place). So far, so interesting.

Many elements here, however, do give us something more than pause. Too many are based on a misreading of recent developments and policy, some seem unrealistic on the timeframe suggested, and quite a lot of them do not fit together at all well - together, a doleful list of what can go wrong with today's (and yesterday's) simplistic policymaking. Let us take these three elements in turn.

There are to begin with some disputable minor to mid-range points about how we got here, which would not detain us too much were they not instructive about the Report’s wider problems. Land for the Many for instance says at one and the same time (in chapter four) that ‘the balance of demand and supply in the land and housing markets is not determined only by the ratio between the number of houses and the number of households seeking somewhere to live’, but also on the very same page that wider trends ‘have pushed demand for houses, and therefore residential land values, to unprecedented heights’. The extent of the role played by supply-and-demand factors as against ‘financialization’ (land property attracting value as a speculative asset) should surely be quantified somewhere, and at the moment the whole picture is left very vague indeed.

In the same chapter there’s a frankly mystifying reference to ‘the lowering of the Bank of England base rate’ in ‘the 1980s and 1990s’, a reference which is later pared back so that it refers only to the period after 1992. This will come as a surprise to all those who were hit by sky-high interest rates not once by twice during the 1980s, and who faced rates that were pretty high by historic standards for many years thereafter. Interest rates have been ultra-low since the crash of 2007-2008, but that has definitively not been the period when landlords piled into the market – for obvious reasons. 

This might be thought of as nit-picking, but arguments that slide around like this are instructive of an intellectual case that is not particularly sure of itself. Is supply and demand - and especially Britain's very restrictive planning system - an important part of price rises, or not? Is the level of real interest rates and the shape of the credit market – which has ebbed and flowed, rather than simply surging, in the recent past – a key determinant in creating an asset price bubble in land? If the picture is mixed, to what extent is it mixed? The more important that first set of causes is, the more we just build more houses; the more emphasis we place on the second, the more there is at least a case for increased regulation.

This slippery focus on the recent past is a feature in some of the other areas under discussion. We are told there has been a ‘frenzy’ of buy-to-let landlordism preventing first-time buyers entering the market – which is undoubtedly true over the longer term, but is hardly the case since the crash, and under successive governments which have actually made landlordism less and less financially attractive. The increase in Buy-to-Let mortgaging is revealingly given via figures from the period 2000-2007, at the height of that boom: but the stock owned by private landlords overall on a rather different timescale, from 2002 to 2015. It is deeply open to doubt whether Buy-to-Let has played the role in inflating house prices that this Report says it has.

We could go on. The Report perfectly reasonably notes just how much more of their income renters are paying for their housing than are mortgaged owner-occupiers, without breaking out the extent to which this is due to owner-occupiers being rather older and better paid than the renters (and the difference being not so much due to the housing market). It quite rightly demonstrates that there has been a rise in empty bedrooms even while house prices have continued to rise, without mentioning that one reason for that is older Britons not wanting to move once their children have left home (opens as PDF). Speaking blandly about the tax structure encouraging turnover is all very well, but what it means from this angle is encouraging voters to sell their houses – people who have chosen not to do so as things stand. Our major concern is that Land for the Many is more interested in getting to its recommendations than in accepting that the situation is complex and multi-dimensional.

It’s when we get to the recommendations that the concerns deepen. The Report recommends a big increase in social housing provision, which is right and welcome. But there are over a million people on the waiting list right now, and annual housing starts in England that number only about 160,000. Lifting the numbers to anything like what we need to meet demand even now, let alone get ahead of ourselves, will be a long haul indeed. The building industry is over-stretched as it is, especially on the employment side, and productivity increases are hard to come by and slow to emerge – as Labour discovered when it tried big reforms and a huge building drive in the second half of the 1960s.

And here we come to the crux of the matter. Land for the Many also recommends rent controls at background inflation levels within the period of any contract, while no-fault evictions should be outlawed for the first three years of any tenancy. That’s better than ideas Labour has previously toyed with, such as lifetime tenancies which would not allow the owner out of any contract even if getting into financial trouble and which would have extended the same rent control over twenty or thirty years. The proposals floated here might move us towards a workable compromise between giving tenants more security and landlords some incentive to stay in the game.

Other features do not, however, fit with this search for a new balance. The Report also proposes a new property tax to replace Council Tax, which would be paid by landlords and not tenants. Extra bands and therefore more progressivity are projected, which is all to the good, but Land for the Many is unattractively opaque about whether this will come in during or after the new three-year tenancies are established. If after, landlords are likely to be exposed to a big new tax at a time when they cannot pass on any of that cost. That’s great for the tenants. But is there really going to be even any capital profit left after that, let alone current incentive? Especially as Labour is here also urged to increase the Capital Gains Tax charged on these dwellings - potentially doubling its rate for Higher Rate income tax payers.

This might sound like the smallest violin time beloved of special pleaders, but it’s not our intention at all to stick up for landlords, rather for the health of a dense, sensitive, interrelated and above all mixed economy of housing – especially during any transition period. As the new tenancy, rent control and tax laws approach, landlords are simply going to dump the lot – especially if they are expected to swallow whole the new Property Tax during the rent control and secured tenancy periods, and if CGT really is pushed up at the same time. Such a landlords’ strike would be analogous, by the way, to the housebuilders’ strike that scuppered Labour’s last attempt, in the late 1960s, to reform the way in which housing land was priced.

Where will all those (ex-) tenants go? Well, some of them will buy. Land for the Many also proposes abolishing Stamp Duty for owner occupiers, which will make that easier, and no doubt house prices will be ‘stabilised’ (for which read: shoved downwards) if these ideas are handled badly. All well and good for them. But lower income tenants, who still cannot buy, will hardly be housed by councils or Housing Associations which are in no position right now (or soon) to suddenly ramp up their output. More than likely, lower income tenants will be pushed to the margins of a private rented sector that British policymakers of all parties tried to revive for fifty years, and which these proposals could (if handled clumsily) eviscerate.

The Common Ground Trust that forms the basis of the Report’s fourth chapter fails to convince as a real way to underpin house prices if landlords did exit the market very rapidly. The idea here is a separation between the value of housing land and bricks and mortar, for those who wished to allow for such a split. The former would be owned by a government-funded Trust that would allow new buyers to simply purchase the physical dwelling. This seems of doubtful utility, especially in the short run. Rather tellingly, no really precise mechanism is proposed as to who would qualify, beyond the extremely bland ‘membership of the Trust would be most obviously attractive for people who want to enjoy a form of home ownership’. Nor are we told how the initial land purchase from the for-profit or private sector seller would work, or how much the plan would cost overall.

In terms of any immediate downwards house price adjustment, this completely underestimates the tendency of our ‘animal spirits’ to overshoot and undershoot imagined values very quickly – so much so that seeking to manage a rapid change in prices with a structural reform will likely end in failure. And it sounds rather too much for comfort like the Labour Land Commission that failed to get off the ground in the 1960s – though the latter, it is true, focused on lowering land costs for builders, not directly for owner-occupiers.

This also doesn’t really get round the distributional problem. House price increases will slow. Absolute values may fall. Given these proposals, owner-occupation will get cheaper because a non-profit, subsidised by the Government, might own the land. That will be great for lower middle-income Britons. But that will still all be beyond the range of the poorest renters, who will live in a shrinking and poorly-resourced sector.  What Labour will have done, as across whole areas of its programme, will have been to redistribute upwards: to finance middle income Britons as the expense of less wealthy ones. More rail subsidies, abolishing tuition fees, free NHS parking for those with cars while the poorest Britons take buses, and so on.

Yes, the very wealthiest will pay more, via more increased taxes on gifts throughout their lifetimes (effectively increasing inheritance taxes), a new and more progressive, Property Tax levied on landlords, higher CGT and the like. But much of that squeeze would take a long time (in contrast to the sharp shock it might administer to the private rented sector). It would also be cold comfort to people who, for whatever reason, want to rent and not to buy.

We can do better than this, quantifying if possible much more closely the extent to which rising land prices are about shortage of supply rather than an influx of capital. Proceeding much more sensitively into reform of the private rented market, providing support to tenants via reversing many of the Housing Benefit cuts of recent years and giving us all breathing space before more social housing can come on stream – because Land for the Many looks more like a plan for a world in which we’ve built half a million new council houses, not one where local authorities are on their knees. And we do still need planning reform as part of the package. Building more houses, and therefore releasing more housing land, exactly where we need them. Since critics of the supply model have a point when they say that ‘build more’ is a hazy nostrum rather than a plan, that means many more dwellings at high density, in the South East, near train stations and bus routes.

At the moment, these proposals are a mixed bag, the hallmark of which are good intentions and strong ideas about transparency, but which have been blended together with a high level of historical, temporal, analytical and geographical confusion, and a naivete about delivery. Looking at these ideas in the round, it’s impossible not to feel deep, deep foreboding about their real effect. Which is a shame – not least for those Britons crying out for better housing.

It's all coming up roses for Jeremy Corbyn

With British politics in chaos, it’s hard sometimes to step back and divine the big winner. Everything seems in flux. The narrative (and the polls) could shift tomorrow. Yet another crisis could intervene and change the frame. Scandals could break. Brexit might be resolved – though it is much more likely that it will not be. But overall, it is hard to resist the temptation that the big winner in all the heat and light is… Jeremy Corbyn (above).

‘What’, you might splutter, ‘one of the most unpopular people, let alone politicians, to ever walk the planet?’ The man who’s taken Labour today into third place in one YouGov poll published today, leading a party regularly flirting with fourth place in opinion surveys and which recently suffered its worst ever national result? You might well raise an eyebrow at this particular (and counter-intuitive) Hot Take. But hear us out. It can’t hurt.

There are three main reasons why Mr Corbyn should be laughing right now. He has achieved almost complete mastery over the Labour Party machine. His main opponents, Britain’s governing Conservative Party, are in a complete mess, faced with a challenge from the Right that seems like an existential threat to their existence. And the last reason? Well, those self-same Conservatives are about to put Boris Johnson into Downing Street – a man who is more divisive, and probably has a much shorter shelf life, than a jar of marmite.

In control of the Party. Rarely can a Labour leader ever have established such complete control over the machine. It’s hard to say whether Tony Blair ever achieved such total mastery, though of course the two cases are not comparable. Mr Blair was winning elections, riding high in the polls and actually doing things at his peak between (say) 1996 and 2001. Mr Corbyn has lost pretty much every election he’s fought. But even so, it’s the latter figure who seems to rule unchallenged. It’s been an absolutely admirable, if cynical, march through the institutions, as one would expect from a cadre of Straight Left enthusiasts and trade union apparatchiks. Their talk of member-led policy was a good and effective smokescreen for a while, though now that even Corbynism’s bodged-up ‘social movement’ Momentum seems to be giving up on internal democracy, the mask has slipped.

Bit by bit, they have rightly put in their own people – Jennie Formby as General Secretary, Karie Murphy in charge of the Leader of the Opposition’s Office, Laura Murray as Head of Complaints. Not only that, but they got the ‘JC9’ elected to the Party’s National Executive Committee, ensuring that a single line or case came out of each meeting, and that their friends could do as they pleased without fear of discipline. Veteran Left-wingers such as Ann Black, as judicious as she was fair in her reporting, were replaced by advocates of The Revolution. The most critical MPs have now deselected themselves by retiring from politics, declining to run again, resigning the Whip, and joining Change UK or the Liberal Democrats. Most social democratic members have walked away. Win or lose, office or Opposition, the Left own the Labour Party for a decade or more to come. That’s a big win.

Likely to govern. Whenever the next General Election comes – and right now the assumption in Westminster and Whitehall is that it will be upon us this autumn or next spring – Labour is the most likely to be the largest Party in the House of Commons. Regular readers will know that this blog has made this argument since at least the autumn of 2017, and we see no reason at all to change our mind. Labour is indeed about as popular as rotting roadkill in your fridge. Its polling scores are mind-numbingly bad. Only Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Foot have ever been as unpopular as Mr Corbyn. But that doesn’t really matter – because the Conservatives’ support has collapsed even faster, and even further, than has Labour’s. Remember: in the event that there isn’t an electoral cataclysm that makes the Brexit Party or the Liberal Democrats the biggest Party, all that matters is the two-Party swing between Labour and the Tories. At the moment, it’s towards Labour. Ergo, they govern.

Remember also that Labour don’t have to win outright. Indeed, this seems very unlikely indeed right now. They only have to reduce the Conservative, Brexit Party and Democratic Unionist ranks in the Commons to less than around or about 322 MPs. There is no way on this planet that the Scottish National Party or the Liberal Democrats will support the Conservatives continuing in office. So as long as Labour plus SNP plus Liberal Democrat plus Plaid Cymru plus Green adds up to 322, Mr Corbyn will go and live in Downing Street. Right now, almost all the pollsters – Opinium, for instance, and Survation, the last two elections’ most accurate pollster – think that this will indeed be the case. So Labour wins. That’s not just a case we’d make from the overall numbers, by the way. Labour has the best ground game. It knows where its voters are, as the Peterborough by-election demonstrated. In a world where lots of seats are going to be won by very tight margins and in three-, four- or even five-way fights, that might matter most of all.

Faced by the worst-best opponent. The single most stupid thing the Conservatives could do would be to elect Boris Johnson as their leader. He unites all non-Conservatives in the entire country against the Tories – and back behind Labour. Imagine a General Election fought by the figurehead of the Leave campaign. All Remainers will want to get their revenge. And the only, single, or at least by far the most likely way of turfing him out of Downing Street? Voting Labour – as, indeed, voters in Mr Johnson’s own by-no-means-safe Uxbridge seat will be invited to do. The atmosphere of energy, tension – even danger – will help the Corbynites no end. Mr Johnson and Mr Corbyn are symbiotic beings. They thrive on each others’ blatant disregard for the reality-based community. What boosts ‘Boris’ causes ‘Jeremy’ to grow in the mind too.

Mr Johnson is not the man who Londoners elected as their Mayor in 2008. Then, he posed as a socially-liberal Tory that you could do business with. Now, his record of appalling racist statements, untruths, recklessness, under-prepared busking nonsense and frankly extremism has caught up with him among that half of the country that is easily labelled Remainia, but actually has far deeper roots as the outward-looking and cosmopolitan party of the country that likes to think of itself as open-minded. Reader, they absolutely loathe him, as you'll see if you click on the detailed data here. He can’t introduce himself as someone new, because to be honest he’s past his best and looking increasing shopworn – like a deflated and faded Paddington Bear. He disrupts no narrative. He finds few voters that the Conservatives haven’t discovered already. Voters might have given a Sajid Javid or a Penny Mordaunt a little bit of space and time to set out their stall. They will rightly give Mr Johnson under one tenth of one second.

Mr Corbyn often looks like a busted flush. Labour membership is falling. His own ratings are not so much in the gutter as the culvert underneath it. Labour is in rapid retreat electorally, especially in Scotland and – it seems – Wales. He is twisting and turning on the main issue of the day, to no-one’s satisfaction and everyone’s irritation. And yet he controls the Labour Party lock, stock and barrel. He is still in our view pretty likely to become Prime Minister. And his ideas have a good chance of becoming hegemonic at a time when the Conservative Party is imploding.

It’s when he gets into power that his real problems will start. Firstly: power will ebb away from him. It won’t only be the SNP and the Liberal Democrats that will have a major say over legislation. Labour MPs, powerless at the moment, will have a veto over every single law their leader wants to pass. Secondly: the leadership team’s analysis of how power works is wrong. As befits the institutional and deterministic way of seeing the world popular in the leader’s office, they think that seizing the commanding heights of the state will allow them to transform the country. Well, not for nothing have political scientists long seen capturing the core executive as wearing a ‘hollow crown’. It isn’t just that the levers aren’t connected to anything: it’s that those levers don’t even exist any more.

Three: all policies are choices, and Labour will have to start to make some. If they abolish university fees, who will get the places under any new numbers cap – the Russell Group or the others? If they want to accelerate housebuilding, where on earth will the building labour come from? Where will the houses go? If Ministers want to subsidise rail travel, do they help workers in the rush hour or relatively lower-income older travellers in the daytime?

If they bring in new types of land tenure for first time property buyers, will those owners be able to take those subsidised advantages with them? Do they allow the SNP another Scottish independence referendum? Will the Bank of England be directed to alter credit policy by region, or to accelerate ‘Green’ investment, and how? All the vague, opaque, contradictory things they have said will come home to roost. Everything in Mr Corbyn’s allotment is coming up roses – for now. But the flowers look pretty likely to be blighted things indeed.

British politics is now full of challengers

This blog has already been very clear about the struggles of the Big Two political parties in Great Britain. They are in a deep hole, and they show every sign of continuing their dig. Two challenger parties – one old, one young – in the shape of the Liberal Democrats and the Brexit Party seem to sit more naturally across the great divides in our politics today. And they’re full of verve and a sense of momentum, while the blue and red teams trudge glumly around in search of eye-catching and popular ideas.

But what about the insurgents fighting to get in from outside this new and unfamiliar four-party system? Because one of the things that was so noticeable about the recent local and European elections was the rise of the Greens and the Welsh nationalists Plaid Cymru, the continued success of the Scottish National Party, and the success of Independents and localists everywhere – while another new grouping, Change UK, seems so far to have comprehensively failed to get off the ground?

Today, on day two of our week-long blogging marathon, we’re going to take a look at a political system that isn’t so much bifurcating between Leave and Remain as crumbling in all directions – with concerns about the environment, transport and housing apparently sitting across the traditional divide of Right and Left just as strongly as Brexit does. Because as the Big Two crumble, it’s not just the New Two that are pushing them around: it’s the little battalions and the sharpshooters too.

The Green surge. We’ve been here before, of course, since over the winter of 2014-15 and leading up to the 2015 General Election the Green Party seemed to be going places – only to disappoint as the date of the polls actually approached. They actually hit 10 or 11 per cent in two polls conducted in January 2015, conducted by YouGov and Lord Ashcroft respectively. But now there seems to be a more sustained upwards drift, reflecting a second and more voluminous inrush of the green tide. The Extinction Rebellion movement, and the publicity surrounding Swedish environmental campaigner Greta Thunberg, have become a cause celebre among voters who might once have been attracted to Cleggmania and Corbynism: increasing evidence of the warming planet is causing voters widespread unease.

Added to a great deal of local organising, on the model that the Liberal Democrats once used to come back from the brink of extinction in the late 1980s and 1990s, and the Greens have a great chance to establish themselves as a permanent player in a multi-party system. Don’t believe us? Well, they put on 194 councillors in early May, and they won 12.1 per cent of the vote (and seven MEPs) at the European elections – coming in just two percentage points behind Labour. The Britain Elects poll tracker now has them on average at 5.4 per cent for a Westminster election, only a little behind their placing during the party’s much-heralded ‘surge’ last time. It will be very, very hard for them to win any more Parliamentary seats, partly because Labour is standing in their way in areas that are demographically and ideologically fertile for the Greens: but it does not seem totally impossible in the medium term.

The nationalist challenge. Welsh and Scottish nationalist parties also had much to cheer. Given constraints of time and space, we’re going to treat their fortunes together here, though we do know that these two countries are very, very different. Plaid Cymru first, because their advance seems the most stunning. They beat Labour across Wales in the European elections for the first time ever, and they didn’t just squeeze out what was once thought of as Wales’ dominant party: they beat them by 19.6 per cent to 15.3 per cent, a swing of over nine per cent since the last such election. Recent opinion polling in Wales, which suggests that Plaid is indeed benefiting from increasing support, confirm the picture. As with the Greens, Plaid will struggle to win many more Westminster seats – maybe only two or three look remotely within reach – but these days, we wouldn’t rule it out.

The SNP’s remarkable run of success continued, with extraordinarily good results for a party which is now twelve years into government at Holyrood. The only real way to put this is to say that theyutterly crushed Scottish Labour in the European vote, since Labour’s vote share collapsed and who nearly came sixth in a country they used to govern without question – as they have done Wales up until very recently. Labour lost its last MEP in Scotland, while the Conservatives also went markedly backwards. Opinion polling (opens as PDF) continues to indicate that both the UK’s ‘main’ parties are going to get a beating in Scotland next time around, with Labour perhaps retreating back to the single seat it won in Edinburgh South in 2015 and the Tories ending up with only two to four Scots MPs. They’ve both played right into the SNP’s hands in so many ways. SNP First Minister Nicola Sturgeon (above) probably cannot believe her luck.

The independent insurgency. One line of the local government results that really made many people sit up and notice was the one said ‘Others – Gains’. Because all round the country, particularist parties of local people who liked to style themselves ‘independent’ of any party won ward after ward after ward. In fact, they made 660 gains – nearly as many as the 705 net pickups that the Liberal Democrats managed. In three districts, for instance Ashfield in Nottinghamshire, the Independents now have overall control. Now, these groups are necessarily drawn from all sorts of people, and seem to represent almost all of the points on the ideological spectrum. Many of them seem to be civic-minded individuals who have taken up the baton of the 2011 Localism Act and run small parish councils, before (as now) trading up into the much bigger world of district elections.

Some Independent groups seemed to be angry about new housing schemes; others were committed to breaking the hold of long-serving councillors who seemed to have become complacent and presumptuous in a world of First Past the Post elections in which they always won their wards. But it’s not just disaffection with Westminster that we’re seeing: the phenomenon seems wider and deeper than that, and to reflect something of a wish to, shall we say, take back more control locally. In many parts of the country, information about for instance the use and survival of bus routes is very controversial, but not freely available; new housing plans are absolutely huge in scale and ambition, but very vague and not really presented in a useable manner; central government funding cuts have often asked local people to step in and fill the void.   

How should we expect this all to turn out when we next go to the polls? Not just some Brexit Party MPs (if that issue remains unresolved), and more – potentially many more – Liberal Democrats. But also ever-sharper challenges to the four parties who now seem to be rotating around the low 20s or high teens in the polls. A lower vote share for the Conservatives and Labour. More wins for the SNP. Probably an increased number of MPs from Plaid Cymru. And a higher vote share, if not any more MPs, for the Greens. And all the time, as the success of Independents and localists demonstrates, a burgeoning sense that this time, the centralised two-party system really is under the most existential threat it has ever faced. This chaotic Parliament may not be the last.

What is the meaning of the Peterborough by-election?

This week, to mark the end of the academic year and therefore Public Policy and the Past’s annual summer hibernation, we thought we’d do something different. So steel yourself for a full week of blogging – each at only half the length we normally attempt, running to only a thousand rather than two thousand words, but hopefully illuminating nonetheless.

It’s been an absolutely terrible year for British politics, which appears now to be in vertiginous decline. Its ranks are dissolving into nothing more than a chaotic rabble. That’s a paradox, because the nation as a whole really does not seem to be exhibiting the same deep amber or red warning signals. So it’s time to take stock. Why does the organised party system in the United Kingdom look to be under such threat? Is the threat real? What are the deeper roots of the crisis, if indeed there are any.

Tomorrow, we’ll take a look at how the traditionally ‘smaller’ British parties are doing, having cast our eye last month over what May’s local and European elections told us about the Conservatives, Labour and the apparently resurgent Liberal Democrats. Then on Wednesday, we’ll examine the likely balance of forces if there is a General Election this year – specifically, the very strange prospect of a Labour government being elected even as its popularity falls off a cliff.

On Thursday, this blog will examine Labour’s recent report on land policy, all the more pressing since they appear to be on the verge of power. We’ll round it all off on Friday with a survey of recent public policy successes, not just to end the year on a slightly more optimistic note, but to highlight again the odd sensation of watching politicians struggle so tragi-comically while the country at large keeps its act together. 

First, and today: what does the recent Peterborough by-election tell us about the parties’ relative standings? Labour’s narrow victory has launched all sorts of not-so-hot takes, usually from partisans whose utterly naked self-interest and boring tribalism make their one-eyed claims all the harder to take. One small part of the kingdom has been to the polls yet again – and with the voter recall of Chris Davies, the Conservative MP for Brecon and Radnorshire, another seat will be up soon too. Can a by-election tell us anything about national standings?

Peterborough might just tell us nothing at all. On one level, it’s important to note that all the hot takery in the world might mean… zilch. We once thought that the Conservatives’ February 2017 victory in Copeland showed that the Tories were on the march, likely to seize Labour seats deep into red territory. Well, it didn’t work out like that, did it?

Let’s go further back, too. Eastleigh in 2013 told the Liberal Democrats that they might be able to hang on to quite a few seats, despite the deep unpopularity of their coalition with the Conservatives among many of their voters. That turned out to be, well, optimistic. Labour’s narrow hold of Darlington in 1983 convinced the party to keep Michael Foot. He then led that party to electoral catastrophe just three months later. Keep in mind that single data points do not make for a conclusive equation.

The by-election told us that the polls are right. One intriguing and comforting point that leaps out from the Peterborough result is that it to some extent confirms the national polling picture. The Brexit Party have hit the low- to mid-20s in many of those surveys: here they got 29 per cent. That party just failed to grab the seat from Labour. It’s not listed as a Brexit Party gain on what is perhaps still the most famous seat predictor, Electoral Calculus – even though that site projects nearly 200 Brexit Party gains.

The polls are also telling us that support for the Conservatives and Labour alike is falling like a stone. That’s exactly what happened in Peterborough. Labour’s vote fell by 17.2 per cent (the fifth worst byelection vote fall for that party in forty years), while the Conservative vote went down by 25.5 per cent. So, very roughly speaking and in the real world where British political polling has a mediocre record, pollsters should be cheered: they don’t seem to be doing too badly.

This win told us that although Labour are suffering, the Conservatives are in an even deeper hole. Labour’s candidate Lisa Forbes (above) got returned to Parliament not because she was particularly popular, but because her party’s vote share fell less than did the Conservatives’. Put very crudely, Labour were more successful in staunching their bleeding to the Liberal Democrats than the Conservatives were to the Brexit Party. Had just a few more Labour voters decided to give the revived and Remain-focused Liberal Democrats a chance, Labour would have lost this seat. And that tells us exactly what the European elections did: Labour’s coalition is falling to bits, but the Conservatives’ alliance with the voters could be completely disintegrating.

The vote totals hinted that there is still life in the ‘old’ parties. Some voting surveys are suggesting that Labour and the Conservatives have shed half their vote since the last General Election. That isn’t quite what we saw here, since although the Tories’ vote did crater on that scale, Labour’s didn’t. Labour seems still to be holding on among minority communities and in diverse areas, a fact that caught our eye too in the European election results. That fact caused quite a lot of unpleasant racist dog whistling from the Brexit Party immediately after this byelection, and a not-so-whispered campaign against the legitimacy of this election focusing on the postal vote. Far be it for us to suggest that Nigel Farage and his supporters would do better to have a think about why non-white Britons loathe them so much.

Meanwhile, one of the main reasons the Brexit Party did not win this seat was that even though it clearly became a two-horse race, the Conservative vote actually held up better than expected against a classic protest vote ‘squeeze’. Mr Farage simply couldn’t persuade enough Conservatives to back his new upstart party – which ended up at about the same nearly-nearly threshold that United Kingdom Independence Party used to bang its head right up against. Close, but no cigar.

So Peterborough confirms lots of things that have been more and more obvious in recent months. It’s only one result, but it makes the polls look as if they are in the right ball park. It demonstrates that the Big Two of red and blue are astonishingly unpopular given that they are supposed to be the main and traditional homes for left- and right-leaning voters. But they are still just about able to block the advance of new entrants such as the Brexit Party. They have the data. They know where their voters are. They have money and machinery. But their dominance is creaking and cracking alarmingly, and they know it. For the rest of the week, we’ll try to suggest why that might be – and why it matters.